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RESTLESS RIVER: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE BEHAVIOR OF THE RIO GRANDE
JERRY E. MUELLER
El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1975
Pp. 155, no index, $5.00 s.c., $8.00 h.c.

LA FRONTERA NORTE DE MEXICO:
HISTORIA, CONFLICTOS
CESAR SEPULVEDA
Mexico: Editorial Porrua, S.A. 1976 Pp. 168, no index.
The nearly 2,000 mile border between the United States and
Mexico is rich in oftentimes turbulent history, and these two books
provide remarkable insight into the difficulties of treaty negotiation
and drafting. Mueller, in RESTLESS RIVER, documents the history
of the boundary along the Rio Grande, and Sep6lveda extends the
discussion to the remainder of the border, from El Paso to Tijuana.
The behavior of the United States in expanding its frontiers does not
come off well in either book.
Detailing how President Polk provoked the war over the Texas
boundary in order to be able to take California and other Mexican
territories, Sepdlveda provides a thorough discussion of the negotiations and a fascinating insight into the Mexico viewpoint and
contemporary reaction to the U.S. actions. The Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, 2 February 1848, put an end to "Una Guerra Injusta" (unjust
war), in the words of Lic. Sepdlveda, and established the boundary.
However, it is one thing to divide two countries on paper but quite
another to fix the same boundary on the land.
The U.S. survey party, in Mueller's words, "discovered one of the
most noteworthy cartographic errors in history."' The map on which
the Treaty was based placed El Paso and Juarez some 34 miles further
south and 130 miles further west of their actual locations. Correcting
this discrepancy would have given Mexico considerably more territory than the U.S. drafters of the Treaty intended. U.S. Commissioner
Bartlett sought to achieve a compromise, and was proud of the fact
that he brought the Mexicans to an agreement that gave the U.S.
possession of the rich Santa Rita copper deposits. "Unfortunately,
1. J. MUELLER, RESTLESS RIVER: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE BEHAVIOR OF
THE RIO GRANDE 23 (1975).
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Bartlett did not realize that he had given away the only possible route
for a southern transcontinental railroad." 2 When President Franklin
Pierce took office, James Gadsden was appointed Minister to Mexico
and given orders to buy the disputed tract of land extending west from
Juarez so that the southern railroad route could be assured.
Hence, the Gadsden Purchase came into being. The American
bargaining was heavy handed, since Gadsden offered $15,000,000 for
the disputed territory but, along with his offer, included a threat of
occupation if Mexico refused to sell.3 The Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo was amended and ratified in April 1845. Mexico in fact
received only $10,000,000, and the U.S. got the irregular boundary
that we have today.
The treaty provided that the boundary between Texas and Mexico
should be in the center of the Rio Grande and that the boundary
would move if there was a "slow and gradual" channel shift.
However, the boundary would not move if the channel shifted
through avulsion. This language lays the ground for the Chamizal
controversy; the river in the El Paso-Juarez area moved to the south
in the latter part of the 19th Century, but there is disagreement as to
just when it moved. The Mexicans argued that since the shift was not
slow and gradual, it had to be avulsive. The Americans countered that
the shift was not avulsive. The matter was committed to arbitration,
with Canadian jurist Eugene Lafleur presiding On the critical
question as to whether Mexico or the U.S. should receive title to the
disputed land, the arbitrators reached a decision that Solomon would
have applauded: the U.S. would obtain title to all land North of the
1864 Channel, and Mexico would reserve title to all land South of the
1864 Channel. Mexico accepted this judgment, but the U.S. rejected
it on the basis that the award did not conform to the guidelines of the
Convention of Arbitration in that the 1910 Convention, in Article III,
states that "The Commission shall decide solely and exclusively as to,
whether the international title to the Chamizal Tract is in the United
States of America or Mexico." The American member of the
arbitration commission therefore argued that the commission was not
empowered to divide the tract and had to give the tract either to
Mexico or to the United States, but not part to each. The dispute
finally was settled fifty years later when President Kennedy chose to
give effect to the 1911 international arbitration award and thereby
removed a stigma against the U.S. that had been used to our disfavor
throughout Latin America.
The Mueller book goes on to bring the river boundary of the Rio
2. Id. at 24.
3. Id. at 26.
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Grande up to date through the 1970 Treaty with Mexico and to
provide some interesting analysis of the international law relevant to
river boundaries. Lic. Septilveda extends the discussion to the major
disputes concerning transboundary resources, including the 1944
Colorado River Treaty, the salinity question on the Colorado, and the
final adjustment of the U.S.-Mexico frontier in 1970.
One can obtain a two dimensional appreciation of the difficulties in
reaching agreement and the possibilities for conflict over the written
text of international conventions by reading these two texts together,
one in English and the other in Spanish.
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